Employment protection and globalisation in dynamic oligopoly by Dewit, Gerda et al.
Employment protection and globalisation in dynamic oligopoly
Gerda Dewit Dermot Leahy Catia Montagna
National University of
Ireland Maynooth
University College Dublin University of Dundee
January 2003
Abstract: We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide where to locate.
Firms choose to locate either in a country where employment protection implies
costly output adjustments or in one without adjustment costs. Using a two-period
three-stage game with uncertainty it is demonstrated that location is influenced by
both flexibility and strategic concerns.  We show that the strategic effects under
Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with adjustment costs while
those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible
country under Cournot and even under Bertrand provided uncertainty and foreign
direct investment costs are low.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Flexibility, Oligopoly, Employment Protection, Foreign
Direct Investment, Location.
JEL Codes: D80, F23, L13
Approximate Word Count (including tables, figures and references): 7850
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to David Collie, Peter Neary, Donal O’Neill,
Olive Sweetman, participants of the European Trade Study Group (Brussels,
September 2001), participants of the Irish Economic Association Conference (April
2002), participants of the European Economic Association Conference (August 2002),
seminar participants at University College Dublin, at the National University of
Ireland Maynooth and at the University of Ghent.
Correspondence: Gerda Dewit, National University of Ireland Maynooth, Department
of Economics, Maynooth, Ireland, tel.: (+)353-1-7083776, fax: (+)353-1-7083934, E-
mail: Gerda.Dewit@may.ie; Dermot Leahy, University College Dublin, Department
of Economics, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland, tel.: (+)353-1-7168551, fax: (+)353-1-
2830068, E-mail: Dermot.M.Leahy@ucd.ie; Catia Montagna, University of Dundee,
Department of Economic Studies, 3 Perth Road, Dundee DD1 4HN, United Kingdom,
tel.: (+)44-1382-344845, fax: (+)44-1382-344691, E-mail:
C.Montagna@dundee.ac.uk .
11.  Introduction
This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interface between
globalisation and labour standards by focussing on the effects of employment
protection on the international location of economic activity.
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable acceleration of the process of integration
of the world economy – often referred to as ‘globalisation’.  The liberalisation of
foreign direct investment (FDI) policies worldwide, which has resulted in investment
flows between countries growing much faster than trade flows, has led to an increase
in the ease with which firms (and jobs) move across national borders.  As a result,
governments’ rhetoric and policies increasingly betray concerns about their countries’
ability to prevent domestic industry from relocating abroad and to attract and/or retain
foreign investment.
Labour market institutions are commonly regarded as playing a crucial role in
determining the location of economic activity, not least if they influence the flexibility
with which firms can adjust output scale and employment levels to evolving economic
conditions. Employment protection laws in particular are identified as a major source
of inflexibility and, increasingly, recommendations are put forward that the state-
mandated redundancy payments – which were introduced in many European countries
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s – are dismantled. The emerging consensus is
that by forcing firms to under-produce during economic booms and over-produce
when the economy slows down1, high hiring and firing costs undermine their ability to
adapt to fast changing competitive markets. Not only is employment protection held
responsible for the poor employment performance of many European countries (e.g.
Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; and Lazear, 1990) but also for hindering countries’
ability to hold on to footloose industries.  It follows that, in a world where countries
perceive themselves as being engaged in fierce competition for economic activity, the
substantial differences that exist between economies (even within the European
                                                
1 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) argue that firing costs are likely to have reduced employment variation
in Europe.
2Union) in hiring and firing restrictions 2 are seen as a source of unfair ‘competitive
advantage’ for those locations with lower costs of employment adjustments.
Whilst a substantial amount of work has been carried out to assess the impact of
hiring and firing restrictions on employment 3, to our knowledge (and despite its
prominence in policy debates) the flexibility offered to firms by a given location in
adjusting to changing economic conditions 4 has received relatively little attention in
the theoretical literature on FDI5.  Instead, the study of industry location has tended to
focus on market access and local costs of production as the central determinants of a
country’s ability to attract FDI and retain domestic firms6. These factors are of course
important.  However, by focusing on the relationship between employment protection
and the location of industry this paper fills an important gap in the literature. To
explore this relationship, we combine ideas from the industrial organisation and the
labour literature, and apply these to a set-up in which firms’ locations are endogenous.
We argue that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, labour market inflexibility may
not necessarily hinder a country’s ability to attract and/or retain economic activity.
This view finds theoretical support in the theory of industrial organisation that
emphasises how commitment (i.e. inflexibility) may be a source of strategic
advantage (Tirole, 1988). We shall therefore investigate how region-specific
flexibility affects location decisions when firms are oligopolistic and act strategically.
In a non-strategic set-up, flexibility only entails advantages for a firm.  This is not
                                                
2 According to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), firing costs have ranged from 0.48 months salary
in Denmark to 5.24 in France and even to 15.86 in Italy.
3 Hiring and firing restrictions are typically not found to have a decisive role on overall rates of
unemployment (e.g. Nickell (1998)).
4 Firm flexibility in terms of “locational portfolio diversification” has been examined in the literature.
More specifically, the role of cost and exchange rate uncertainty in providing a rationale for setting up
plants in different countries has been respectively studied in de Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987) and in
Sung and Lapan (2000).
5 Cooke (1997) finds evidence that host countries’ restrictive legislation governing layoffs have had a
negative effect on US foreign direct investment abroad.  Moran (1998, p.89) summarises evidence from
investor surveys and mentions labour regulations, in particular “flexibility in hiring and laying off
workers”, as one of the main concerns for firm location in economies of transition and developing
economies.  A cursory look at available data (UNCTAD, 2001), however, does not seem to support the
conventional wisdom that employment protection is unambiguously inimical to inward FDI.  Amongst
the European countries with higher than average values of the employment protection index
constructed by Nickell, Nunziata and Quintini (2001), a significant number also show higher than
average levels of inward FDI (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) – in
general, no clear correlation emerges by comparing the data on shares of world FDI and employment
protection levels.
6 See Smith (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and (1992).  For a comprehensive survey on
multinationals and FDI we refer to Caves (1996).
3necessarily true when firms act strategically, since flexibility then implies lack of
commitment power.  Firms producing in locations where employment is less flexible
may therefore benefit from potential advantages obtained by the commitment power
that such inflexibility implies7.
We use a two-period oligopoly model, in which firms’ location decisions depend on
strategic and flexibility considerations. Our analysis will be driven by two substantive
questions.  First, do location-specific sources of inflexibility create strategic
advantages that affect a country’s ability to retain production of internationally mobile
firms?  As we argued, while this question has remained largely unexplored in the
theoretical literature8, policy makers often cite strict employment protection as a
threat to the anchorage of domestic industry.  Second, when can we expect to find
strategic clustering in the same regions and when is strategic geographical dispersion
more likely?  By focussing on this question, this paper complements the economic
geography literature, which is mainly concerned with agglomeration formation in
non-strategic set-ups9.
The model is outlined in Section 2. The non-strategic determinants of location are
analysed in Section 3, while the strategic implications of inflexibility are discussed in
Section 4. Section 5 analyses the location decisions of firms and examines the effects
of increasing globalisation on the strategic incentives to geographical agglomeration.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
Two firms plan to launch new products, which are imperfect substitutes, to be sold in
an integrated market.  One firm, the Home firm, has its headquarters in the country
named “Home”, while the other, referred to as the Foreign firm, has its headquarters
in the country named “Foreign”.  Each has to decide where to locate their production
plant: either in “Home” or in “Foreign”.  We assume that the fixed costs of setting up
a plant are sufficiently high to ensure that each firm chooses to have one plant only.
                                                
7 The effect of adjustment costs on strategic behaviour has been discussed in set-ups without location
decisions (see Lapham and Ware, 1994; Jun and Vives, 2001).
8 The strategic effects of production cost differences on location choice have received ample attention
in the literature (see references in footnote 6).
9 See, for instance, Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
4Competition takes place during two periods, with firms choosing “market actions” –
outputs under Cournot and prices under Bertrand competition – in each period.  The
respective demand functions for the Home and the Foreign firm for period one are
given by
*
111 eqqap --= (1a)
1
*
1
*
1 eqqap --= (1b)
In period two, the firms’ respective demand functions are:
ueqqap +--= *222 (2a)
ueqqap +--= 2
*
2
*
2 (2b)
where 10 <£ e  is an inverse measure of product differentiation10, and a>0. The
Home firm’s price and output are denoted by p  and q , respectively.  Variables
referring to the Foreign firm are starred.  Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the time period.
In period one, demand for that period is observed but there is uncertainty about future
demand.  Hence, a stochastic component, u , enters the demand function for period
two and is defined over the support [ , ]u u , with mean Eu=0 and variance 2s . The
uncertainty is resolved at the start of period two 11.
As mentioned above, each firm has to choose either Home or Foreign as its
production location.  We assume that these countries differ in one important respect.
In Home, strict labour market regulations, inspired by a concern for employment
protection, prevail.  These cause firms to incur hiring and firing costs if, after an
unexpected change in demand, they want to deviate from the period-one production
(and hence employment) level.  By contrast, labour market regulations in Foreign are
lax, implying that expansions or reductions in production can be carried out without
incurring any adjustment costs.  The profit functions for the Home (p ) and the
Foreign firm ( *p ) are respectively given by12
CRR -+= 21p (3a)
                                                
10  Strictly speaking, the model could allow homogeneous products (e=1) with Cournot behaviour, but
not with Bertrand behaviour.
11  We restrict the support ],[ uu  to guarantee interior solutions.
12 We assume that the discount factor is unity.
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where tR denotes the Home firm’s revenue in period t (with t=1,2) and C stands for its
total cost; *tR and 
*C refer to the Foreign firm.  Total costs consist of terms that are
location specific and others that are not.  They depend on the location chosen by the
firm and on whether it engages in FDI or not.  The matrix in (4) gives the cost
function for each firm in each location:
Home location Foreign location
Home firm: C j+L++ 21 cqcq dj +++ 21 cqcq
Foreign firm: C* dj ++L++ **2
*
1 cqcq j++
*
2
*
1 cqcq
(4)
Production costs are not location specific since the marginal cost of production (c) is
assumed to be the same in both locations.  This allows us to abstract from location-
specific cost differences.  Adjustment costs ( L and *L ) are, however, location
specific; they are paid in period two, but only if the firm locates in the inflexible
(Home) location.  They are denoted by 212 ))(2/( qq -ºL l  for the Home firm and by
2*
1
*
2
* ))(2/( qq -ºL l  for the Foreign firm13. The l-parameter ( 0>l ) measures the
degree of inflexibility.  Firms that locate in Foreign, the flexible location, incur no
adjustment costs.  The firm’s fixed cost of setting up a plant in its native country is
denoted by j .  However, if it locates abroad, then its fixed costs are dj + , with
0>d .  In other words, d  represents the costs associated with FDI.  These may, for
instance, be due to the costs incurred in dealing with foreign languages, foreign laws
and a foreign taxation system14. More generally, d can be thought of as reflecting the
barriers to the mobility of capital, and will therefore shrink as the degree of market
integration increases.
                                                
13 This adjustment cost specification is standard in the literature.  Other (e.g., linear, asymmetric)
specifications would make the analysis technically more tedious without changing the qualitative
results (see Hamermesh (1996, Ch.6) for a textbook survey of different employment adjustment cost
specifications).
14 This was first formalised by Hirsch (1976).
6Firms play a two-period three-stage game, acting simultaneously in each stage.  The
sequence of decisions is shown in figure 1.  In period one, production locations,
Home (H) or Foreign (F), are chosen (stage one).  There are four possible location
equilibria: two in which both firms choose the same location, (H,H) and (F,F), and
two in which firms choose a different location, (H,F) and (F,H).  For each location
pair, the first letter refers to the Home firm’s location choice, whereas the second
indicates the Foreign firm’s location choice.  No FDI occurs in the (H,F)-equilibrium,
while both firms engage in FDI in the (F,H)-equilibrium.  In stage two, period-one
actions are determined given demand for period one but with uncertainty about
demand in period two.  In period two, the uncertainty is resolved and firms choose
market actions after having observed actual demand for that period (stage three).
[Figure 1 about here]
In this model, a firm’s location decision is influenced both by non-strategic and
strategic factors.  The non-strategic aspects of the production location choice are
examined first.
3. The non-strategic dimension of the location decision
To focus on the non-strategic location determinants, we initially abstract from
strategic behaviour by considering the limit case of e=0 in which one firm’s product
is sufficiently different from its rival’s that each firm effectively becomes a
monopolist.  In the absence of strategic behaviour, only cost and flexibility
considerations will determine firms’ location choices.
The location choice of a Foreign monopolist is simple: it will always choose to
produce in Foreign since this choice entails maximum flexibility without incurring the
cost of FDI.  For a Home monopolist, the location decision involves a trade-off
between the costs of FDI and the flexibility benefits associated with producing in
Foreign.  Due to demand uncertainty, the firm anticipates it will face adjustment costs
in Home, while there will be no adjustment costs when it produces in Foreign.
Note that there is a critical level of uncertainty above which the Home monopolist
will choose to produce in Foreign and below which it will choose to locate in Home.
7This critical 2s -level decreases in the degree of labour market inflexibility in Home
(l) and increases in the degree of international capital immobility (d ).
4. Strategic implications of employment protection
When products are substitutes, i.e. e>0, firms behave as duopolists and their location
decisions involve both strategic and non-strategic considerations.  Solving the game
backwards, in this section we explore the strategic implications of employment
protection at fixed locations (location choice is discussed in section 5).  Since firms
interact differently under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, we study the
strategic implications of the production location in both forms of oligopoly.  For
expositional clarity, we explain the nature of the strategic effects in detail using the
case in which each firm produces domestically, that is, the Home firm produces in
Home and the Foreign firm in Foreign (i.e., (H,F)).  The strategic behaviour in the
other possible location equilibria will be discussed at the end of each subsection,
using table 1, which reports the strategic term in all possible location combinations.
4.1. Cournot competition
Firms’ production locations affect their market actions.  We first consider period two,
in which locations and period-one outputs have already been chosen.  Period-two
reaction functions under Cournot competition are obtained by maximising period-two
profits, 2p  and 
*
2p , with respect to outputs. When each firm produces domestically,
(i.e., in the (H,F)-case), we have  L--= 222 cqRp  and 
*
2
*
2
*
2 cqR -=p .  Firms’
respective second-period reaction functions are given by
( )ll ++-+= 2/)( 1*22 qequAq with caA -º (5a)
2/)( 2
*
2 equAq -+= (5b)
Expressions (5a) and (5b) clearly suggest that a firm’s location has implications for its
flexibility.  The  Home firm’s reaction function responds less to unexpected demand
shocks than its rival’s does ( uquq ¶¶<¶¶ // *22  from (5a) and (5b)).  The firm in
Home is also less responsive to changes in rival output ( 2/)2/( ee <+ l ).  In other
words, the labour market inflexibility in Home affects the slope of the Home firm’s
8second-period reaction function.   Finally, due to adjustment costs, the Home firm’s
reaction function depends positively on its own past output, as captured by the term in
1q .
We now turn to stage two.  Being uncertain about the demand in period two, firms
simultaneously determine their outputs for period one by maximising total expected
profits with respect to first-period outputs.  With ),,,( *22
*
11 qqqqpp =  and
),,,( *22
*
11
** qqqqpp = ,  first-order conditions are given by15
0)]/([ 1
*
2*21
=+ dqdqEE
qq
pp (6a)
0)]/([ *12
**
2*1
=+ dqdqEE qq pp (6b)
Subscripted variables denote partial derivatives.  In (6a) and (6b), the second term on
the left-hand-side captures the strategic effects.  The strategic term in (6a) is positive
( 02*2 <-= qqp  and 0/ 1
*
2 <dqdq ), implying that the firm in Home strategically over-
produces in period one (or, 0
1
<qEp ). By choosing a high output level in period one,
the Home firm is forced to keep its production in the next period at a relatively high
level, since changing its production then is costly16.  This commitment to keep
production high in period two forces the rival firm to cut back its output.  Meanwhile,
there is no strategic behaviour by the firm in Foreign (i.e., the strategic term is zero,
since, from expressions (5a) and (5b), 0/ *12 =dqdq ).
Evidently, the (H,F)-case is not the only possible location combination that can arise.
The upper half of table 1 presents the strategic terms for both firms under Cournot
behaviour for all possible location combinations.  If both firms engage in FDI, (F,H),
only the Foreign firm strategically over-produces in period one.  If both firms produce
in Foreign, (F,F), neither firm acts strategically.  Finally, if both firms produce in
Home, (H,H), then each firm behaves strategically and over-produces in period one.
4.2. Bertrand competition
                                                
15 From the envelope theorem we know 0*22 *
22
==
q
q
pp , and thus 0**
22
==
qq
EE pp .
16 Diagrammatically, the Home firm’s expected second-period reaction function has shifted out.
9With Bertrand competition firms’ market actions are now prices (see figure 1).
Nesting the case with Bertrand competition in the model outlined in section two
requires inverting the demand system given in expressions (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b).
Thus, we obtain
)( *111 eppq --= ba and veppq +--= )(
*
222 ba (7a)
)( 1
*
1
*
1 eppq --= ba and veppq +--= )( 2
*
2
*
2 ba (7b)
with )1/( ea +ºa , )1/(1 2e-ºb  and )1/( euv +º .
Like under Cournot, we first concentrate on the case in which each firm produces
domestically (i.e., the (H,F)-case).
Starting with the final stage of the game, the second-period price reaction functions
are given by
( ) ( ))2(/)1(),())(1( *2*1112 blbblbblbabl +++-+++= peppqcvp  (8a)
( ) bbba 2/2*2 epcvp +++= (8b)
for the Home and the Foreign firm respectively17.  The Home firm’s price reaction
function responds more to unexpected demand shocks than its rival’s does
( vpvp ¶¶>¶¶ // *22  from (8a) and (8b)).  Since the firm in Home is less flexible in
output, unexpected demand shocks will be translated in a larger price flexibility.  For
the same reason, the Home firm’s optimal price is more responsive to changes in its
rival’s price (or, 2/)2/()1( ee >++ blbl ). The Home firm’s past output level enters
negatively in its second-period price reaction function.  As output is sticky in the
presence of adjustment costs, a higher output in period one is associated with a higher
output in period two and therefore with a lower price. This has important implications
for firms’ price setting in period one, to which we now turn.
                                                
17  A firm that faces adjustment costs effectively faces upwards sloping marginal costs in period two.  It
is well known that increasing marginal cost may lead to problems with the existence of the Bertrand
equilibrium (for discussion of non-existence of equilibria under price competition, see for instance
Tirole (1988), p.214).  High e-values require low l-values to ensure existence. We restrict attention to
parameter values that ensure the existence of the four possible location equilibria.
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In stage two firms simultaneously set first-period prices, taking into account their
effect on future prices.  Total differentiation of firms’ expected profits with respect to
first-period prices yields the first-order conditions for period one, given by18
0)]/([ 1
*
2*21
=+ dpdpEE
pp
pp (9a)
0)]/([ *12
**
2*1
=+ dpdpEE pp pp (9b)
In the (H,F)-case, the strategic term in (9a) is positive ( 0)]/([ 1
*
2*
2
>dpdpE
p
p , as
shown in table 1), which implies that the firm in Home strategically over-prices in
period one ( 0
1
<pEp ).   As a result, in period-one demand for the Home firm’s good
and hence its output will be low.  It follows that, due to its production inflexibility, in
period two the Home firm will keep its output low and its price high (see expression
(8a)).
Unlike in the Cournot case, the firm in Foreign also has an incentive to behave
strategically. More specifically, that firm strategically under-prices (i.e., since
0)]/([ *12
*
2
<dpdpE pp , as reported in table 1, 0
*
*
2
>pEp  from (9b)).  This is because it
benefits from a high rival price in period two and can achieve this by cutting its price
in period one.  The lower Foreign  price reduces the Home firm’s output in period one
and this raises its price in period two.  Furthermore, even though it is fully flexible,
the strategic effect (per unit output) for the firm in Foreign is larger in absolute value
than that for the firm in Home.  Both the Home firm’s strategic over-pricing and the
Foreign firm’s strategic under-pricing in period one, guarantee that the Home firm’s
period-one production remains low.  This will push up both firms’ expected prices in
the next period19.
So far, only the (H,F)-case has been discussed.  In the (F,H)-case, the Home firm
(now located in the flexible Foreign location) will act strategically by under-pricing in
period one, while its Foreign rival (now located in Home and hence inflexible in
output) will choose to over-price. If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), neither firm
has a strategic incentive. If both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then both firms will
                                                
18 From the envelope theorem we know 0*22 *
2
2
==
q
p pp , and thus 0
*
*
22
==
pp
EE pp .
19 Diagrammatically, the strategic behaviour of both firms causes the second-period reaction function
of the Home-firm to shift out.
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strategically under-price in period one (see table 1): even though a concern for high
future prices gives each firm an incentive to keep its first-period production low (by
overpricing in period one), it creates an even greater incentive for firms to keep their
rival’s first-period production low (by underpricing in period one)20.
[Table 1 about here]
5.  Location patterns
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production
location.  Taking  the rival’s production location as given, each firm simply selects the
location that yields the highest expected profits.  To explain how firms’ location
choices are determined, it will prove useful to decompose expected maximised profits
( pE ) as
ò -+=
u
u
duufuE )())(( 00 pppp (10)
In expression (10) the first term, )(0 Eupp º , denotes deterministic profits with
F-= qp0 ; q  is deterministic operating profit and F  is the fixed costs incurred by
the firm, which depends on whether the firm locates in its domestic economy ( j=F )
or abroad ( dj +=F ).  The second term in (10) represents the expected profit gain
from demand shocks.  Because profits are convex in u, this term is non-negative and
increasing in 2s .  In fact, we are able to write 20 )())(( gspp =-ò
u
u
duufu , where g
reflects the firm’s ability to exploit unexpected demand shocks.  Thus, expected
maximised profits are F-+= 2gsqpE .  Given the costs of FDI, d , locations are
determined with each firm bearing in mind deterministic operating profits, q , as well
as expected profit gains from demand shocks, 2gs .
                                                
20  The (H,H)-case refers to a situation in which both firms incur adjustment costs.  Vives and Jun
(1999) explore the strategic incentives for symmetric (i.e., each facing the same adjustment costs)
firms, calculating Markov perfect equilibria.  Their results are consistent with the results in our (H,H)-
case, obtained here in a two-period game.  Their analysis does not include the case in which only one
firm faces adjustment costs (our (H,F) and (F,H) case) and is not concerned with firms’ location
choices.
12
The value of g  depends, among other things, on the location combination.
Obviously, for both firms the ability to exploit demand shocks is higher in ),( FF
than in ),( HH .  Furthermore, a firm’s g  is smallest when it is inflexible and its rival
is fully flexible.  Conversely, a firm’s g  is largest when it is flexible and its rival is
located in the inflexible location: it then is the only firm that can fully adjust to
unexpected shocks.  The ranking of the g -parameter in the different location
combinations is the same under Cournot and Bertrand competition and is given by
HFHHFFFH gggg >>> (11a)
for the Home firm, and by
FHHHFFHF **** gggg >>> (11b)
for the Foreign firm, where the first superscript refers to the location of the Home firm
and the second one indicates the location of the Foreign firm.
The value of q  also depends on the location combination.  Note that, since the
strategic interactions in Cournot competition differ from those under Bertrand
behaviour, the ranking of the q -values will be different for each type of oligopoly.
Under Cournot competition, the Home firm’s deterministic operating profits at the
different location combinations are ranked as follows
FHHHFFHF qqqq >>> (12a)
while the ranking for the Foreign firm is given by
HFHHFFFH **** qqqq >>> (12b)
This q -ranking is determined by the strategic behaviour of firms 21.  In ),( HH , both
firms’ first-period strategic overproduction (see table 1) does not yield any future
output advantage, but merely results in a lower future price.  Hence, deterministic
operating profits are lower for both firms than in ),( FF , when firms do not act
strategically.  However, given the rival’s location choice, a firm always attains higher
                                                
21 In fact, this q-ranking only depends on strategic effects.  Consider the hypothetical situation in
which, given firms’ location choices, first-period market actions are not observed.  Then, in what is
often called an “open-loop” equilibrium, a firm’s second-period action cannot be contingent on first-
period market actions.  In this hypothetical benchmark, firms cannot act strategically and the q-values
for every location combination would be the same.  For a discussion of the open-loop equilibrium, we
refer to Tirole (1988, p.325-326).
13
deterministic operating profits by committing to high output; it obtains a future gain
in market share if its rival is flexible ( FFHF qq >  and FFFH ** qq > ) and avoids a
future loss in market share if its rival is inflexible ( FHHH qq >  and HFHH ** qq > ).
Under Bertrand competition, HHFF qq >  because in ),( HH  both firms strategically
underprice, resulting in lower prices in both periods (while there is no strategic price
setting in ),( FF ).  Furthermore, we have HFHH qq > .  In words, the inflexible
(Home) firm’s deterministic operating profits are higher if the Foreign rival is
inflexible too.  To understand why, first note that a firm always strategically
underprices when it faces an inflexible rival.  Thus, the Foreign firm will underprice
both at ),( HH  and ),( FH . But, its strategic aggressiveness, which harms the Home
firm, will be strongest at ),( FH , when it is itself flexible.  Hence, under Bertrand we
always have the following ranking of deterministic operating profits for the Home
firm
HFHHFF qqq >> (13a)
The position that FHq  takes in this ranking depends on the level of l .  As long as the
degree of employment protection (l) is not too high, FFFH qq > .  But, as l increases,
FHq  falls and eventually, at very high l, HHFH qq < .  Similarly, we have the
following ranking for the Foreign firm
FHHHFF *** qqq >> (13b)
with the position of HF*q  in this ranking depending on l  and with FFHF ** qq >  for
low to moderately high levels of l ; as l  keeps rising HF*q  starts to fall and
eventually we have HHHF ** qq < at very high values for l.
While q and g depend for each form of oligopoly on the location combination (with
the rankings given above), they also depend on the exogenous parameters: the degree
of employment protection (l), the product differentiation parameter (e) and the
market size ( caA -º ).  Together with these parameters, firms’ location choice will
also depend on the FDI-cost, d , and the level of uncertainty, 2s . Since the analysis
of firms’ location decisions involves many unwieldy algebraic expressions, graphs are
used to ease the exposition.  Without loss of generality, A is normalised to one.  The
14
figures are depicted in ),( 2 ls -space, which means that they are drawn at given
values of d and e.
In order to highlight the importance of d in explaining the type of location pattern that
emerges, we will distinguish between two different cases.  First, we shall focus on a
situation in which firms incur a significant cost of FDI (section 5.1).  In that context
there is a natural tendency for firms to locate domestically, thereby avoiding the high
FDI-costs.  We refer to the circumstances in which the Home firm produces in the
inflexible Home location as “domestic anchorage”.  Formally, this occurs in the
equilibria ),( FH and ),( HH .  The extent to which strategic behaviour affects
domestic anchorage is examined in section 5.1. Second, we shall explore how
increasing degrees of globalisation (in the form of falling values of d) influences
location patterns (section 5.2).  In particular, we shall investigate when strategic
agglomeration – i.e., firms producing in the same location (formally, ),( HH and
),( FF ) for strategic reasons only – will emerge if firms can choose their production
locations on a global level playing field.
In our analysis, we will also point out the effects of product differentiation (e) on
location.  From section 3 we know that Cournot and Bertrand competition both
converge to the monopoly case at e=0.  As e increases, the strategic effects become
stronger and the two types of oligopolistic behaviour give rise to divergent location
patterns. The figures are drawn for e=0.75, which brings out clearly the differences in
location patterns between the two market structures.  In contrast to the FDI-cost, the
degree of product differentiation tends not to affect location patterns in a qualitatively
significant way. We will briefly comment on the effects of e at the end of each
subsection.  Hence, we cover all the qualitatively different cases that arise with
different parameter combinations.
5.1. Domestic anchorage
Suppose that the fixed costs associated with FDI are high enough for the Foreign firm
never to choose to locate in the Home country.  Then, any potential strategic
advantage of locating in Home would be dominated by the FDI-costs and hence the
firm will, even under certainty, produce in Foreign (as uncertainty rises, the
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attractiveness of the Foreign location increases). Given that the Foreign rival produces
in Foreign, we then need to examine where the Home firm will set up its plant.
Figure 2 shows the location pattern that emerges in ),( 2 ls -space.  The equilibrium
location combinations under Cournot and under Bertrand are indicated by superscripts
C and B respectively22.
[Figure 2 about here]
Since competition is tougher under Bertrand than under Cournot behaviour, price
competition makes it harder for firms to carry the costs of FDI. Based on these
considerations only, one would therefore expect the area with domestic anchorage to
be larger under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  In fact, it is clear from
figure 2 that the opposite is true: the region in which domestic anchorage occurs is
larger under Cournot (areas I and II) than under Bertrand competition (area I only).
This seemingly counterintuitive result can be explained by the strategic
considerations underlying firms’ location decisions 23.  Under Bertrand competition,
given rival production in Foreign, the Home firm is, from a strategic point of view,
better off producing in Foreign ( BFF ),( in area II) than in Home ( HFFF qq > , see
expression (13a)).  By producing in Foreign, it avoids the massive first-period price
undercutting by its rival that would occur if the Home firm were to produce in Home.
In contrast, under Cournot competition, the Home location holds strategic advantages
( FFHF qq > , see (12a)), implying that the Home firm will produce domestically
(giving (H,F)C) in area II.
As product differentiation increases (i.e. as e falls), strategic behaviour is diminished.
As a result, the area with domestic anchorage shrinks under Cournot competition
                                                
22 In the figures, the maximum value for l is limited to ensure the existence of all possible equilibria.
At e=0.75, l-values smaller than (approximately) 2.5 are needed for the existence of the (H,F) and
(F,H) equilibria under price competition (see also footnote 17).  Under quantity competition, values for
l do not need to be restricted.  However, nothing changes qualitatively at l-values above those
depicted.
23 In fact, if firms do not behave strategically in stage two, and hence q takes the same (open-loop)
value at each location combination (see footnote 21), the area with domestic anchorage is larger under
Bertrand then under Cournot competition.
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whereas it expands under Bertrand competition.  Importantly, the area with domestic
anchorage is always largest under Cournot behaviour.
5.2. Globalisation and strategic agglomeration
The process of globalisation implies that capital mobility increases.  In our model this
is captured by falling FDI-costs (d ).  As barriers to capital mobility are progressively
lowered, other location equilibria, beside (H,F) and (F,F), start to emerge.  Figures 3
and 4 show the location pattern under quantity and price competition respectively.
Even a brief glance at these figures confirms our previous finding that domestic
anchorage remains strongest in industries with Cournot behaviour: the region in
which the Home firm produces in Home is much larger under Cournot (areas Ia and
Ib in figure 3) than under Bertrand  (area I in figure 4).
With increasing globalisation, the cost of FDI (d ) falls and so it is easier for firms to
invest abroad.  Thus, the cost to the Home firm of acquiring flexibility by investing in
Foreign is now lower.  In figures 3 and 4, the threshold uncertainty locus below which
the Home firm produces domestically is now lower than in figure 2.  The area in
which the Home firm is located in Home has shrunk (areas Ia and Ib in figure 3; area I
in figure 4), meaning that domestic anchorage is less easily sustained, while FDI from
the Home firm into the Foreign location becomes relatively more important.  In both
figures this is reflected in an enlargement of area II, in which (F,F) is the unique
equilibrium.  Increased globalisation reduces the critical level of uncertainty above
which firms produce in  Foreign  to obtain high production flexibility.
When low FDI costs are combined with low uncertainty, strategic considerations in
the location decision become relatively more important. Under Cournot competition
this strategic concern encourages inward FDI at the inflexible location (in area Ib in
figure 3), leading to the (H,H)-equilibrium.  The Foreign firm actually has to jump a
barrier and set up its plant in the Home location to avoid ending up in the worst
possible strategic position ( HFHH ** qq > , see expression (12b)).  The (H,H)-
equilibrium is an example of strategic agglomeration, in the sense that the
agglomeration would not occur in the absence of strategic behaviour.
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Under Bertrand, globalisation combined with low uncertainty can lead to FDI by the
Home firm as it tries to locate in the strategically favourable flexible Foreign location
(resulting in (F,F)).  As shown in figure 4, provided that the level of employment
protection in Home (l ) is sufficiently high, the (F,F)-equilibrium occurs even at
certainty ( 02 =s ); this too is an example of strategic agglomeration.  In this case, the
Home firm is willing to incur the FDI-cost purely for strategic reasons ( HFFF qq > ,
see expression (13a)).
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
As globalisation deepens and d  falls further, regions in which domestic anchorage
prevails become smaller still.  In the limit, with complete globalisation ( 0=d ), firms
effectively lose their nationality.  The respective location patterns that then occur
under quantity and under price competition are shown in figures 5 and 6.  Even then,
firms may want to locate in the inflexible Home location.  In fact, at sufficiently low
levels of uncertainty, (H,H) is the unique equilibrium under Cournot competition.
Moreover, (H,H) can also be an equilibrium (together with (F,F))  under Bertrand
competition, but only at very high degrees of employment protection.  This (H,H)-
equilibrium is also an example of strategic agglomeration because, at high l ,
HFHH ** qq > ; given that the Home firm produces in Home, the Foreign firm sets up
production in Home too, thus avoiding an unfavourable strategic position.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be relatively robust to
changing degrees of product differentiation.  It is worth mentioning that as product
differentiation increases (e falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but only at
lower levels of uncertainty.
6.  Conclusions
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We have explored how differences in labour market flexibility affect location
decisions when future demand is uncertain and firms act strategically.  When demand
uncertainty is very high, firms will cluster in countries where the labour market is
relatively flexible, thus avoiding costly redundancy packages during economic
slowdowns and expensive overtime payments or hiring costs in economic booms.
Among countries with a high degree of capital mobility, this location pattern may
even prevail at relatively low levels of uncertainty.
However, when firms act strategically, they may be willing to forego flexibility and
produce in countries where the labour market is relatively inflexible in order to obtain
strategic advantages.  This is the case when the firms engage in Cournot behaviour.
Under quantity competition an inflexible location allows a firm to commit to high
future output, which makes the inflexible location more attractive at low levels of
uncertainty.  This strategic advantage helps to maintain domestic anchorage of firms
in locations with strict labour regulations.  Under price competition however, a firm
located in the inflexible country faces aggressive pricing from its flexible rival in
period one. As a result, the inflexible location is unfavourable both from a strategic
and a flexibility perspective.  Hence, both strategic and flexibility incentives work
against domestic anchorage under Bertrand competition.
We have shown that deepening globalisation can lead to a greater tendency for the
development of strategic agglomeration. This is the case under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition.  Under Cournot competition, firms facing low FDI-costs cluster
in the inflexible location when uncertainty is low (this can also occur under Bertrand
competition at very high levels of employment protection and when uncertainty is
very low). Such clustering has however a prisoner’s dilemma character with firms all
producing higher output and enjoying less flexibility than they would in a location
with lower labour adjustment costs. Under Bertrand competition, when strategic
agglomeration occurs, it does so mainly in the flexible location as firms flee the
strategically unfavourable inflexible location.
When formulating the policy lessons from this analysis, one should proceed with
caution.  Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the level of employment
protection is exogenous.  This is a reasonable assumption since the political
unwillingness to change employment protection regulations, once these are in place,
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is often strong.  It does not, however, preclude policy makers from using location-
dependent fiscal incentives to increase the attractiveness of their region.  Our analysis
suggests that countries with strict labour regulations will find it less difficult to
achieve domestic anchorage of key industries, by using fiscal incentives, when firm
behaviour is approximated by Cournot rather than by Bertrand competition24.
Finally, we have not derived optimal employment protection levels in this paper.  This
would require taking into account the link that typically exists between employment
protection and labour costs: employment protection tends to push up labour cost – not
least because it strengthens workers’ bargaining power – which would in turn affect a
location’s attractiveness for investors.  Whether and how a government should design
its labour standards optimally in order to achieve domestic anchorage and to
maximise its FDI-inflow is a question left for future research.
                                                
24 Whether firms’ behaviour is better described by Cournot or by Bertrand competition would need to
be empirically investigated on an industry-by-industry basis.  There exists a substantial empirical
literature on this issue (for a textbook survey, see Martin (2002), Ch.7).
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Stage 1: Firms choose location
Possible combinations:
(F,F) ; (H,F) ; (F,H) ; (H,H)
Stage 2: Firms choose 1st-period market actions:
• (q1, q*1) if Cournot competition
• (p1, p*1) if Bertrand competition
Stage 3: Firms choose 2nd-period market actions:
• (q2, q*2) if Cournot competition
• (p2, p*2) if Bertrand competition
PERIOD 1
Uncertainty
PERIOD 2
Certainty
Figure 1: The sequence of decisions
Table 1: The strategic terms in all possible location combinations 
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Figure 2: The location pattern under Cournot and Bertrand competition: 
High FDI-costs ( d =0.01; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 3: The location pattern under Cournot competition with increased globalisation: 
Intermediate FDI-costs (d =0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
Ia: (H,F)
Ib: (H,H)
II: (F,F)
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Figure 4: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with increased globalisation: 
Intermediate FDI-costs (d=0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 5: The location pattern under Cournot competition with complete globalisation:
No FDI-costs (d=0; e=0.75; A=1)
I: (H,H)
II: (H,H);(F,F)
III: (F,F)
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Figure 6: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with complete globalisation:
No FDI-costs (d =0; e=0.75; A=1)
I: (H,H);(F,F)
II: (F,F)
